We examine the impact of incomplete risk-sharing on growth and welfare. The source of market incompleteness in our economy is private information: a household's idiosyncratic productivity shock is not observable by others. Risk-sharing between households occurs through long-term contracts with intermediaries. We …nd that incomplete risk-sharing tends to reduce the rate of growth relative to the complete risk-sharing benchmark. Numerical examples indicate that the welfare cost and the growth e¤ect of private information are small.
Introduction
Recent research has found evidence that is inconsistent with the full insurance predictions of the complete markets model. For example, Cochrane (1991) , Mace (1991) and Hayashi et al. (1996) provide evidence against complete risk-sharing within the US at the individual level; Townsend (1994) and Maitra (1997) reject full insurance across households within Indian villages; and Backus et al. (1992) , Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1997) provide evidence against cross-country consumption risk-sharing. Motivated by this …nding, we consider the e¤ect of risk on growth and welfare. We develop an environment where household production is subject to idiosyncratic shocks which are private information, and growth is endogenous. The assumption of private information provides a basis for market incompleteness; the resulting problem of incentive compatibility eliminates the possibility of complete risk-sharing. Households share risk through long-term contracts with competitive intermediaries. The enduring relationship allows intermediaries to exploit intertemporal trade-o¤s, thereby providing (partial) insurance.
Previous work on risk and growth typically has contrasted complete risksharing with autarchy. Since the extent of market incompleteness is endogenous in our environment, we are able to examine an intermediate case. We …nd that the presence of uninsurable risk reduces the rate of growth relative to the complete risk-sharing benchmark. This, for example, di¤ers from the result in Devereux and Smith (1994) . Comparing autarchy with complete risk-sharing, in a model 1 of capital risk which essentially shares our technology and preferences, they …nd that the e¤ect of risk on savings, and hence growth, is ambiguous. 2 Our results indicate that the impact of risk on growth and welfare is likely to be sensitive to the origin of market incompleteness and the types of insurance arrangements allowed.
In related work, Marcet and Marimon (1992) examine a two-agent model with capital accumulation where a risk-neutral investor with unlimited resources invests in the technology of a risk-averse producer whose output is subject to productivity shocks which are private information. 3 Our work extends their analysis to a market-clearing economy with endogenous growth. In contrast to Marcet and Marimon, we …nd that investment, as well as consumption, is a¤ected by shocks to production. As a result, there are growth e¤ects of private information. However, numerical examples indicate that, on average, the growth and welfare e¤ects of incomplete risk-sharing are likely to be small.
In section 2 we describe technology, preferences and the contract. Section 3 solves the contract assuming logarithmic utility, while section B of the appendix examines the contract when utility is iso-elastic. Numerical examples are presented in section 4; these provide quantitative measures of the size of the growth and welfare e¤ects resulting from private information. Section 5 discusses additional applications of our model. In particular, there are several interesting 2 The ambiguous e¤ect of risk on savings was noted by Levhari and Srinivasan (1969) . Specifically, when the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is low (high), risk tends to raise (reduce)
savings. (See also Weil (1990) .) Obstfeld (1994) shows that when risk sharing leads to a portfolio shift into riskier, more productive assets, it may be growth promoting. 3 See also Aiyagari and Williamson (1997) for a model of credit in which only the social planner has access to capital.
2 di¤erences between our long term contracting economy with production and the more standard model of contracts with risky endowments. These may be of independent interest.
The Environment
In each period, there is a large number of households each of which operates a technology of the form Y t = z t K t where Y t is output, K t is capital, and z t is the level of productivity at time t = 0; 1; : : : . Productivity, which is independently and identically distributed across households at any time, and over time for any household, takes on one of two possible values: it is z i with probability ¹ i > 0, i = 1; 2, where 0 < z 1 < z 2 and ¹ 1 + ¹ 2 = 1. We de…ne the expected value of productivity as » = P 2 i=1 ¹ i z i and assume that capital completely depreciates after production.
Households are in…nitely lived, and possess time separable preferences over sequences of consumption with period utility from current consumption, C, of the form
for ¾ > 0 and ¾ 6 = 1,
Note that, for convenience, we normalize the utility function by (1 ¡¯) 2 (0; 1) where future utility is discounted by¯.
Each household participates in a permanent contract with a risk-neutral, competitive intermediary. As we will characterize the solution to the contract using a functional approach, we …nd it useful to provide a recursive description of the timing of events within the contractual arrangement here. 4 In any period, only the household observes its own productivity, thus there is private information with respect to output. At the beginning of the period the household has a predetermined capital stock, K. Given the household's capital, the intermediary announces a set of potential transfers, B i , and investments, K 0 i , as functions of the impending productivity report. Upon observing its output, z i K, the household determines a report for the intermediary. Subsequently, the intermediary executes the transfer, and implements the investment for the household, which determines its capital stock at the onset of the next period. By de…nition, if the contract is incentive-compatible, then, at every point in time, the household will truthfully report the level of productivity. Hence, the household's consumption in state i will be C i = z i K + B i and its investment will be K 0 i . As is evident from above, the intermediary observes the household's investment but not its consumption. The intermediary can borrow from, or lend to, other intermediaries at a competitive interest rate. This yields a constant discount factor, q 2 (0; 1), that is determined by equilibrium conditions.
In the initial period, a large number of intermediaries compete to establish permanent contracts with households. As a result of perfect competition, intermediaries' initial expected discounted pro…ts for each contract are driven to zero; consequently, each household accepts a contractual arrangement that yields it the highest feasible level of lifetime utility.
Our approach to solving the contract adapts the methods used to characterize 4 However, a formal statement of the contractual arrangment as a sequence problem is contained in the Technical Appendix.
4 the risky endowment model of long-term contracts. 5 An important assumption in extending the existing results to our analysis is that the household has no ability to invest in an unobservable manner. The value of misreporting productivity lies in being able to consume hidden output. A parable may be helpful. Let the stock of capital represent trees and let the fruit of these trees be consumed or planted to yield fruit-bearing trees for the next period. Our assumption on the observability of investment is equivalent to assuming that the intermediary is able to observe the quantity of trees, at any point in time, but not the yield per tree.
A household may hide output, fruit, from the intermediary. This hidden fruit may be consumed. However, if the household chooses to plant any of it, then it is observable, in the form of trees, in the next period. This allows the intermediary to infer the household's deception.
In order to ensure truth-telling (incentive-compatibility), we constrain the contract so there are no gains from one-period temporary deviations from truthtelling. That is, the contract is temporarily incentive compatible (t.i.c.) in the sense of Green (1987) . Provided certain boundary conditions, satis…ed by our problem, hold, temporary incentive compatibility is equivalent to incentive compatibility. Next, since the t.i.c. constraints introduce future expected lifetime utility as a state variable, we follow Green in characterizing the contract by solving a dual, expenditure minimization problem for the intermediary. Standard duality theorems ensure that this solution also solves the utility maximization problem faced by household. 6 Finally, we impose an aggregate resource constraint 5 See for example Green (1987) , Taub (1990) , Phelan and Townsend (1991) , Atkeson and Lucas (1992) and the related analysis of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Thomas and Worrall (1990) . 6 Proofs of these results are contained in the technical appendix. 5 upon our economy: the sum of consumption and investment cannot exceed output. This is related to the approach taken by Atkeson and Lucas (1992) in the context of an endowment economy. However, in contrast to their work, we solve for equilibrium, not e¢cient, allocations.
Let U 0 i represent expected lifetime utility, starting next period, for the household, assuming that it will accurately report productivity from that date onward, given a current productivity report of z i . When the state is z 1 , temporary incentive compatibility is ensured by the following constraint.
The left hand side of (2.1) represents the value to the household with actual output z 1 K of truthfully reporting its productivity. Provided that misreporting the level of productivity generates a feasible level of consumption, then the right hand side of the constraint represents the value of following this strategy. The t.i.c. constraint when productivity is z 2 is given below.
Note that, as z 2 > z 1 , non-negativity of C 1 ensures that z 2 K +B 1¸0 , eliminating the need for a conditional constraint. As discussed in Oh and Green (1992) , concavity of v implies that if both (2.1) and (2.2) are to hold, then B 1¸B2
2) binds and B 1¸B2 (B 1 > B 2 ) then (2.1) is satis…ed (holds with inequality). These results will prove useful below.
As indicated earlier, we obtain equilibrium allocations for the contracting economy using a dual approach. Given an initial utility entitlement, U, and capital stock, K, for the household, the intermediary solves an expenditure minimization problem. Hereafter, we will refer to the solution of the expenditure minimization problem as the contract. In this formulation, we must impose a promise-keeping constraint upon the contract which ensures that the household's expected lifetime utility satis…es its initial entitlement.
Let the expected present value of expenditure be E(U; K). Recall that the intermediary discounts future expenditures by q. The contract, which minimizes the intermediary's net expenditure, by choice of
, subject to the incentive compatibility constraints (2.1) -(2.2) and the promise keeping constraint (2.3), satis…es the following Bellman equation.
The expected present value of expenditure, at the optimum, will equal the sum of expected current expenditure and the discounted expected present value of expenditures incurred from the next period onwards.
A competitive intermediary must maximize the household's expected lifetime utility; in equilibrium, this implies an initial level of expected lifetime utility, U 0 , given the household's starting stock of capital, K 0 , such that the zero pro…t condition E (U 0 ; K 0 ) = 0 is satis…ed. This zero pro…t condition is required only at the beginning of each long term contractual arrangement. As competition between intermediaries is for permanent contracts with households, we cannot impose this condition in subsequent periods. However, we will establish the result that, in equilibrium, the intermediary's expected pro…ts are indeed zero in every period.
Analysis
In this section we provide a complete characterization of the private information economy for the case of logarithmic preferences. The case of general iso-elastic utility is similar, and is summarized in section B of the appendix.
The Contract
In order to solve the Bellman equation, we de ‡ate the value function by capital.
This allows us to reformulate the contract in an intensive form which, by exploiting a homogeneity property of the constraint correspondence that describes the set of feasible allocations, reduces the dimension of the state vector. Let
Rewrite the objective as
Now de…ne a composite state variable, u´U ¡ log K. Consistency requires that the future state, conditional on i, is given by u
while the t.i.c. constraint at z 2 is equivalent to
Subtracting log K from both sides of (2.3), the promise-keeping constraint be-
Since the constraints above depend only upon the composite state variable, we are able to de…ne W (u) = E(U; K)=K. The intensive form problem, which describes expenditures per unit capital, satis…es the following Bellman equation.
where the minimization is with respect to (b i ;°i; u
. We now analyze the intensive form contract. Let¸and µ be the multipliers for the constraints (3.3) and (3.4). We suppress (3.2) which never binds, as is shown below in proposition 3.1. The …rst order conditions, with respect to (b i ;°i; u
, are listed below. 7 Standard results imply that the value function is strictly increasing, convex and di¤eren-tiable. See Stokey et al (1989) .
The Benveniste-Scheinkman theorem implies W 0 (u) = µ.
Conditions (3.6) -(3.11) allow a strong characterization of the risk-sharing contract. Firstly, the introduction of productive capital o¤ers a channel for adjusting utility entitlements absent in the endowment model. The linear production structure implies that utility entitlements, U , are linear functions of the logarithm of the capital stock, K. As a result, the continuation value of the state variable,
i , is independent of productivity and the initial state, u. Changes in expected lifetime utility which occur in response to productivity reports are implemented through changes in the household's stock of capital. Secondly, risk-aversion on part of the household implies that the contract insures current consumption: when the household reports low productivity the net transfer is higher than when it reports high productivity (b 1 > b 2 ). Alternatively, repayment is lower. However, the presence of private information limits the extent of risk-sharing. Households must be prevented from under-reporting income during periods when income is relatively high. As a result, reports of low productivity reduce lifetime consump-tion. Given diminishing marginal utility, the cost minimizing intermediary will spread this fall in lifetime consumption over time. Consequently, our third result is that low productivity results in both lower current consumption and reduced investment (c 1 < c 2 and°1 <°2). These qualitative characteristics of the contract are summarized in the following proposition. (All proofs are in Appendix A.) Proposition 3.1. In the log case, u
The higher transfer when z = z 1 , given the binding incentive constraint at z 2 , implies that the t.i.c. constraint at z 1 does not bind, as assumed above.
Equilibrium
As noted earlier, since E is strictly increasing in U given K, the zero pro…t condition E (U; K) = 0 will determine the highest level of (initial) expected lifetime utility feasible for the household given its (initial) stock of capital, K. Since E (U; K) = KW (U ¡ log K), this zero pro…t condition implies W (u) = 0. Given strict monotonicity of W , this pins down u and implies that U is proportional to log K. Hence u and the contract
are the same for all households.
As a result, any household with capital stock K and productivity z i will be allocated current consumption (z i + b i ) K and investment°iK. Average output for all households with K units of capital will be »K, assuming a positive measure of such households; average consumption for this group will be
Economy-wide market clearing requires that aggregate output equal the sum of aggregate consumption and investment. Let Ã (K) represent the distribution of capital across households over the space of current capital holdings, K. Equilibrium requires that
This market-clearing condition implies that 
The introduction of private information reduces the mean rate of growth, P 2 i=1 ¹ i°i , relative to the complete risk-sharing value of¯». As a result, the intermediary's discount rate, q ¡1 ¡ 1 falls. We suggest the following explanation. If, upon observing z 2 , the household truthfully reports the productivity then it con-sumes C 2 , while misrepresentation yields consumption equal to (z 2 ¡ z 1 ) K + C 1 .
All else being equal, higher levels of capital tend to increase the current gains to deviations from truth-telling. The contract then requires larger variations in both C i and U 0 i in order to ensure incentive-compatibility. Given convexity of preferences, this tends to reduce welfare for any given level of resources. This welfare reducing aspect of additional capital makes investment less attractive in the private information economy relative to the complete risk-sharing economy.
Hence the overall rate of capital accumulation is lower under private information.
Proposition 3.2. In equilibrium, q > » ¡1 and
We calculate the expected increase in lifetime utility as
2 and Jensen's Inequality jointly imply that the expected increase in welfare is lower under private information. However, this does not imply that welfare has a negative trend leading to the immiserization of almost all households. This result, due to the possibility of economic growth, is in sharp contrast to the endowment model. Since we cannot assume that the equilibrium allocation is e¢cient, it is important to emphasize that the lack of a negative trend may not characterize the e¢cient allocation.
Numerical examples
We examine several numerical examples. These allow us to describe the risk sharing arrangement in more detail and obtain preliminary evidence on the magnitude of the growth and welfare e¤ects of the incomplete risk-sharing environment. The baseline parameter values we use are in table 1. The average level of productivity is set equal to the long run return on equity in the U.S., » = 1:065, as indicated in 13 Mehra and Prescott (1985) . We allow productivity to vary symmetrically around its mean. Thus we assume that ¹ 1 = 0:5 and x = » ¡ z 1 = z 2 ¡ ». The parameter x is di¢cult to calibrate. In our baseline case we set its value to imply that the coe¢cient of variation of z is 0:1. This value implies a standard deviation of consumption growth of 0:0468, which is close to 0:044 predicted by the base case of Heaton and Lucas (1996, table 4, p.458). 8 Finally we choose¯so that » = 1:02. The aggregate rate of growth for the complete risk-sharing economy, when household preferences are logarithmic, matches the long run growth data, as documented in Parente and Prescott (1993) . This is also the average rate of growth under autarchy, and, as we shall see, not signi…cantly di¤erent from the rate of growth under incomplete risk-sharing.
We …rst examine the case of logarithmic preferences. Across the three di¤erent allocations, autarchy (A), incomplete risk-sharing (I) and complete risk-sharing (C), u + log K represents the level of expected lifetime utility for a household with capital K. Thus u is the expected lifetime utility for a household with one unit of capital. Each entry in the rows of tables 2 through 5 marked loss represents the percentage decrease necessary in the level of consumption under complete risksharing, at every point in time, to match the level of welfare associated with the other economies. We de ‡ate all quantity variables by the level of capital. Thus, given a shock z i , the household's savings is ¡b i and c i is consumption, per unit capital. Investment per unit capital is denoted°i, which is also the gross rate of growth of capital. The average rate of growth is denoted E(°), while r is the percentage discount rate (q =
1+r
). Finally, ¢U represents the expected increase in lifetime utility. 8 Below, we will examine examples involving di¤erent values of x.
14 In table 2 we see that, in the complete risk-sharing allocation, consumption and investment are unresponsive to the productivity shock. The household's savings varies with productivity so as to completely smooth the consumption pro…le. The incomplete risk-sharing economy induces ‡uctuations in current consumption, but this variability in consumption is low relative to that under autarchy. There is a net transfer of resources from households with high current productivity to those with low current productivity: c 1 +°1 > z 1 while c 2 +°2 < z 2 . For those experiencing below average productivity, this reduces savings, while boosting both consumption and investment, relative to autarchy. The residual variability in consumption, and the reduced average growth rate, causes expected welfare to increase more slowly than under complete risk-sharing, ¢U = 0:0184 < 0:0198.
The inability to smooth consumption under autarchy implies high variability in both consumption and investment rates. Consequently, welfare increases yet more slowly, ¢U = 0:0148.
In …gure 1, we illustrate initial expected lifetime utility for the complete risksharing, incomplete risk-sharing and autarchy economies. As indicated by the loss measures in table 2, the move from complete to incomplete insurance is equivalent to a 1:6% decrease in the level of consumption, while autarchy implies an 11:2% decrease. In this example, we see that incentive compatible arrangements are relatively successful in smoothing consumption. The switch from such an economy to autarchy results in a signi…cant loss in expected utility, measured in units of full insurance consumption, for the typical household.
In …gures 2 and 3 we graph the evolution of the distribution of capital (K), de ‡ated by the compounded growth factor, and expected lifetime utility (U ) for the incomplete risk-sharing economy. All households are initially identical. Recall that the intermediary enforces truth-telling by o¤ering relatively higher lifetime utility entitlements for high productivity reports than for low productivity reports at each point in time. As a result, both distributions of wealth and utility, are characterized by increasing dispersion over time. For this example, the distribution of utility entitlements within each period is symmetric. Convexity of preferences then implies a skewed distribution of capital. In proposition 3.1 we showed that, in the private information economy, changes in welfare are implemented through changes in capital. This log-linear mapping is also, of course, present in the autarchic model. The greater variability in investment present in autarchy implies that the private information economy dampens dispersion over time relative to autarchy.
Next, in table 3, maintaining our other baseline parameters, we allow the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion, ¾, to vary between 1 2 and 4. We …nd that the rate of growth under private information is consistently below the complete risksharing equivalent. This result, which we have found to be robust, indicates that the growth reducing e¤ect of incomplete risk-sharing, found for logarithmic preferences, extends to the case of iso-elastic utility. Interestingly, both the growth and welfare e¤ects of private information fall as ¾ rises. Recall that higher values of ¾ are associated with increased reluctance to substitute consumption across time.
As shown in proposition 3.1, potential deviations from truth-telling raise current consumption at the expense of future consumption. As ¾ increases, the attractiveness of such behaviour is reduced. This reduces the costs of private information and shifts the incomplete risk-sharing allocation closer to full insurance. For all ¾, the contract is relatively e¢cient. Even when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is high (¾ = 0:5), the loss is only 2:57%. Note that, for the same ¾, the loss under autarchy is more than three times as large, 9:77%. For higher values of ¾, autarchy yields larger welfare losses relative to incomplete risk-sharing.
Furthermore, under autarchy, income uncertainty generates a strong motive to self-insure through savings when risk aversion is large. This drives the high rates of growth relative to complete risk-sharing. As is well known, the sign of the risk e¤ect on savings changes when ¾ crosses one. In contrast, the growth rate under incomplete risk-sharing is always below that under complete risk-sharing, and the growth e¤ects are small.
In table 4, we vary the coe¢cient of variation of z. This implies changes in z 1 and z 2 . All other parameters are maintained at the values listed in table 1.
Higher variability of productivity implies higher risk and tends to reduce both growth and welfare under private information. However, the di¤erences in rates of growth never rise above one-tenth of one per cent and the associated welfare loss is small relative to autarchy. Table 5 (1) the growth e¤ects of incomplete risk-sharing are small and (2) the incomplete markets economy achieves levels of welfare close to the levels attained under complete risk-sharing. The relative e¢ciency of the private information economy arises from the ability to adjust capital, and hence output, in response to the changes necessary in lifetime utility entitlement over time. This implies that changes in a household's utility entitlement are matched by proportionate movements in the gain from understating productivity, (z 2 ¡ z 1 ) K.
Concluding remarks
We have examined the impact of incomplete risk-sharing on growth and welfare, in an environment with private information. In our economy, households share risk by entering into enduring relationships with competitive intermediaries. We have found that the aggregate growth rate is lower under private information than under full insurance. Furthermore, the risk-sharing arrangement, while incomplete, is relatively e¢cient and the growth e¤ects of private information are generally small.
Our work adapts the methods used to study long term contracting with risky, unobservable endowments to an economy with production and capital accumulation. The contract with capital exhibits several properties which contrast with the standard model. 9 First, expected lifetime utility, while growing more slowly than under complete risk-sharing, does not necessarily contain a negative trend.
Second, the contract exhibits the property that all changes in welfare are implemented through changes in the household's stock of capital. Consequently, welfare always exceeds the autarchy value of capital. Finally, while both the endowment and production economies share the property that the distribution of wealth or utility entitlements is characterized by increasing dispersion, in the production 9 Examples, already mentioned above, include Green (1987) and the equilbrium model of Atkeson and Lucas (1992) . As noted earlier, the properties that distinguish our model of risksharing with production and capital accumulation may not hold in e¢cient allocations.
18 economy this rising inequality is larger under autarchy. 10 The contract implements risk-sharing by conditioning the household's future lifetime utility, or wealth, on the current report of productivity. Thus we emphasize the problem of unobservable returns to investment, the common emphasis of the literature on private information in development economics. If investment were itself unobservable, then our risk-sharing arrangement would be infeasible.
11
In particular, the intermediary cannot exploit di¤erences in the rates of intertemporal substitution across households. It is, however, unclear what types of risksharing arrangements are then feasible. We view this as an area for future research.
An implication of our …ndings is that if resources may be devoted towards either We divide the proof into 5 parts. 2)¸> 0: (By contradiction) Given part (1), assume that¸= 0. Next, from (3.8) and (3.9) we have°1 =°2 while (3.6) and (3.7) yield
3)°1 <°2: Given parts (1) and (2), we may solve (3.10) and (3.11) to obtain°1
Given parts (1) -(3), we know that¯log°2¡¯log°1 > 0 which requires
3) to hold with equality.
Given part (2), rearranging (3.6) and 3.7) we have
Proof of Proposition 3.2
As W 0 ¡ u 0 i ¢ = µ and qµ = 1, (3.10) and (3.11) may be solved as°1 = µ¯¡¸1
. Next (3.6) and (3.7) may be rearranged as
It then follows that
Given proposition 3.1, we know that¸> 0, so that, as z 1 < z 2 , we know thaţ
B. Iso-elastic preferences
We solve the iso-elastic case, drawing heavily on the analysis of section 3. The intensive form composite state variable, for this case, is given by u = U K 1¡¾ . The contract is determined by solving (3.5) subject to (B.1) -(B.3).
Suppressing (B.1) which, as before, does not bind, de…ning¸to be the multiplier for (B.2) and µ the multiplier for (B.3), we derive the following e¢ciency conditions with respect to
It is straightforward to show that proposition 3.1 holds for the general isoelastic case. Furthermore, equilibrium in the economy with iso-elastic preferences may be calculated using the method described in section 3.2. An examination of the growth e¤ects of private information given iso-elastic utility, which requires numerical methods, is contained in table 3 and discussed in section 4. The agent has a strictly increasing and continuous von Neumann -Morgenstern period utility function v : R + ! R and subjective discount factor¯2 (0; 1). The expected lifetime utility from a plan (K; B) 2 ¦(K 0 ) and a reporting strategy As we shall see, the intermediary's expenditures will be discounted at some constant rate q ¡1 ¡ 1. Under this assumption, let E 0 (K; B) be the discounted cost implied by the plan (K; B) 2 ¦(K 0 ):
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12 The probability space (Z; Z; ¹) generates the …nite dimensional product probability spaces (Z t ; Z t ; ¹ t ), t = 0; 1; : : : , as well as the in…nite dimensional probability space of all measurable sequences of technology shocks (Z 1 ; Z 1 ; ¹ 1 ) in the standard manner.
De…nition A.1. The contract between an intermediary and an agent is the solution to the following problem: given K 0 , maximize V (K; B; z) over the set of all plans (K; B) 2 ¦(K 0 ) satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint (A.1) and the …nancial constraint E 0 (K; B) · 0.
Let the value of the optimum, be denoted V ¤ (K 0 ).
A.1. temporary incentive compatibility
Having de…ned incentive compatibility, we now develop the well known equivalent, temporary incentive compatibility. This will allow us to characterize a solution to the contract using a recursive approach. Below, we de…ne temporary incentive compatibility constraints and prove their equivalence to incentive compatibility for the above contract. Our proof draws heavily on the work of Green (1987); we adapt his techniques to an environment with investment.
Given a plan (K; B) 2 ¦(K 0 ), and the reporting of a partial history z t¡1 2 Z t ,
we de…ne the expected value of truthful future reporting as
where note that ¹ k = ¹ k¡1 £ ¹. 13 Given (A.3), preferences will satisfy 13 If s¸t then t z s = (z t ; z t+1 ; : : : ; z s ) 2 Z s¡t+1 , otherwise t z s = ;. Note that incentive compatibility is equivalent to (z; 0)-incentive compatibility.
If the agent has reported productivity z t¡1 through date t ¡ 1, and is constrained to truthfully report productivity from date t + 1, we de…ne a plan to be (z; t)¡temporarily incentive compatible 
